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PRFACE.
When the subject of this thesis was suggested to me
as a good one for investigation I accepted it as one fur-
nishing much room for independent research, there being so-
many of the States having laws on the subject of bankruptcy.
The more I continued my investigations, however, the more
convinced I became that the safne path marked out for me was
one already well trodden by the most cminent, jurists in both
this country and in England; and there was little left for
me to do but to collect and report the reasonings and con-
clusions which they had set forth.
In doing this I have quoted liberally from the opinions
of the learned judges in both countries and am also much
indebted to Mr. Bishop's invaluable work on Insolvent Debtors
and also the work of Judge Cooley on The Conflict of Laws,
knowing that, as my object was to state the law as it exists,
I could in no way improve either on their language or judg-
ment for the period covered. I have tried as best I could
to ascertain and state the trend of judicial decisions sub-
sequent to the period covered by those distinguished authors,
and if my work in this direction can add any authority to
support the principles laid down by them, or can set forth
in their true effect decisions which bear upon points that
when they wrote were unsettled questions, I shall feel that
my work has not been entirely without profit.
Ithaca, May 28, 1894. F. F. W.

INTRODUCTION.
Every commercial country has some system of bankruptcy.
From the early jurisprudence of the Roman Empire down to
the present day, it has existed in scme form in nearly every
nation. The French and Teutonic nations engrafted it into
their Codes, and in England it has prevailed for nearly
two centuries.
In the United States the right to enact a uniform
system of bankrupt laws was conferred upon Congress by the
Constitution, though in such a way that it did not take
from the states the power to pass bankruptcy laws in the
absence of a national enactment on the subject.a  The fail-
ure of the congressional attempts at legislation upon this
important subject is historic. In 1800 an act was passed
which was simply a carefully prepared Digest of the English
Statutes as they then existed, without any proper adapta-
tion of the system to the needs of this country. It was a
law for creditors only and was soon repealed. In 1841
Congress went to the other extreme and enacted a law which
a Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213.
resulted for the benefit of debtors only, and this also was
soon rescinded. Again in 18C7 Congress anacted another
bankrupt law, but this to failed in effect the object of
its advocates and was in turn short lived. The result has
been that for the greater portion of our national existence
we have been without a comprehensive uniform system of
bankrupt laws and have been forced to rely on State legis-
lation which is necessarily conflicting and unsatisfactory.
As to the need of some such law, there can be no ques-
tion. Its use is two-fold: First, to secure to the honest
but unfortunate business man, release from his debts when
he is unable to pay them after applying all his property
to that purpose, and thus permitting him to start anew; and
second, to prevent the dishonest and the tricky from de-
frauding their creditors. As ka the need of such provision
is admitted, so the enactment of bankruptcy or insolvency
laws are important; and in the present day of great busi-
ness ventures, when an insolvent often has both debtors
and creditors in two or more states, the question of the ex-
tra-territorial effect of the laws of each becanes of the
greatest importance, for upon that effect frequently depends
Uthe distribution of a large part of the insolvent's estate
In the following pages we will examine such effect of the
laws and try to formulate and express the general rules as
laid down in the different jurisdictions for the disposi-
tion of such property.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY
GENERAL AS SI GNMENTS.
It is not our purpose to deal with assignments in
general, but in order to understand thoroughly the decisions
in the various States and the ground on which they are based,
a few words are necessary on the force and effect of molun-
tary assig-nments, and the characteristics which distinguish
voluntary general assignments from those which are called
involuntary, or assignments under and by force of insolvency
laws.
A voluntary assignment has been well defined as a
transfer by the debtor, without legal compulsion and with-
out consideration, of all his property to an assignee for
b
the payment of his debts. It is obvious that no Statute
is necessary to give validity and effect to a voluntary
general assignment, and this is of great importance because
we have so many statutes upon the subject, and their bearing
is frequently misunderstood. The assignor can do with his
property what he pleases; he may give it away or make any
other distribution of it, provided he does not controtert
b. Mills v. Parkhurst, 126 N. Y., 89.
the Statute of trusts on the one hand or the tatute of
frauds on the other. The fact that Statutes regulating
assignrents have been passed in almost every State does not
deprive fim of those rights or take from _t~mse assignments
the quality of being voluntary. They merely regulate a
conceded power; they do not compel the debtor to make an
assignment. The assignment is a trust deriving its validi-
ty from the debtor's voluntary act and the terms of the in-
strument which he has executed. It is obvious that a con-
vayance of this sort, in trust, in the absence of Statutes,
while all right if fairly made yet it may be made the in-
strument of the grossest frauds; the assignee may be irre-
sponsible; information as to the extent,- of the assets and
liabilities may be ascertained with great difficulty; there
will be a lack of summary measures to bring the assignee
before a Court of justice and see that he administers his
trust in a way to protect creditors; to meet and remedy
these commonly recognized evils the Statutes have been passed.
These Statutes vary greatly in the different states. Ques-
tions as to how far preferences will be allowed and what
shall be done by the assignee in the administration of the
estate, in someare regulated with great nicety,iwhilein
others they are left almost as a common law; but it must
not be forgotten that however regulated, the assignment
takes effect from the voluntary act of the debtor. c Just
how far a law must go, to remove assignments made under it
from the classification of voluntary, is not entirely clear.
It is well settled that any law which provides for the en-
tire distribution of the debtor's property among his credi-
tors, on his cormmitting an act of bankruptcy or appealing
to its provisions for relief from his debts, would be a
d
bankrupt law. This is, of course, an instance of a bank-
rupt law in the generic sens3. It is held, also that any
law which required a creditor to relinquish any of-his
rights against the insolvent debtor, as a condition pre-
cedent to sharing in the distribution of such debtor's estate
under the assignment, would be considered a bankrupt law
within the provisions of the rule. e It is probable from
the trend of decisions that any law which does not act against
the insolvent debtor, in invitum, or does not restrict in
any way the rights of creditors, would be considered as a
mere regulating statute,and not an insolvent law.
c Lectures of Prof. Hughes.
d III re Wait 99 N. Y. 433.
e Barth v. Backus 140 N. Y. 230.
REAL PROPERTY.
Unlike personalty , there can never be any doubt as
to the jurisdiction over real estate. Every State and ever,.
nation has provided laws which govern its transfer, and many
of them have adopted fonrms to be used in making a voluntary
transferal. They have provided for the recording or fil-
ing of the deeds, and have thrown every safeguard around the
title. It is the one article of property which requires
a close adherence to fixed rules of law in the transfe4
of title to make it binding and secure. This being the case,
it is evident that a rule of comity cannot operate to effect
a transfer of real property unless all the requirents.of
law of the
the Asitus are complied with. It is a general rule, both
in this country and in Englandthat the title and disposition
of real estate are exclusively subject to the laws of the
country in which it is situated, which alone can prescribe
f
the mode by which title to it can pass. A deed or mortgage
can have no effect of itself except by virtue of the law of
the State in which the land is situated, and it is well set-
tled that a general assignment by an insolvent debtor,under
and by force of an insolvent law of his domicile,cannot pass
f Osborn v. Adams 18 Pick. o/.... L
. Dundas v. Bowler 3 McLean 399.
8real estate situated in another State.a The same principle
applies as well to voluntary as to bankrupt assignments.b
a Hutchison v. Peshine,l Greene 167;
Rogers v. Allen, 3 HM ). (0.) 488;
Osborn v. Adams,18 Pick. 247.
b Burrill on Assignment 462;
2 Kent's Com. 489 note.
CHAPTER IV.
PERSONALTY.
In the consideration of the questions arising from the
application of foreign laws to domestic personal property,
we encounter the great difficulties of tils subject, and
scarcely any two jurisdictions agree as to all the details
of the law and their application. In general, however,
there are two separate and distinct lines of decisions:
One originating with the English Courts, and so called the
English doctrine; and the other called the American doc-
trine.
THE ENGLISH DOCTRINE.
The reasoning of the English Courts is, to a great ex-
tent, the same as the American. They declare that all
personal property is subject to the law which governs the
domicile of the owner. It is undisputed that the owner
canby a voluntary act on his part, transfer to another,
all his property without regard to where situated, and an
assignment under the bankruptcy law of his daiicile is as
valid and effectual a transfer of his property as if made
personally by him. If the transfer is valid and binding
under the law of his domicile, it makes no difference what
means were used to effect it. a  In short it is held that an
assignment under the English bankruptcy act, transfers all
the bak~rupt's right and title to the assigned iT hmn proper-
ty wherever situated as completely as thet bankrupt himself
could do by a voluntary transfer. b It was even held that
any property of the bankrupt, brought into Fn-land by any
person who obtained it subsequent to the assignment, might
be recovered from hiA- by the assignees for the benefit
of creditors; and that an attachment by creditors in a
foreign country, is void as against 
the assignee.c
Mr. Story in his work on the Conflict of Laws states
the propositions established in England as follows: "First,
that an assignment under the bankrupt law of a foreign
country, passes all the personal property of the bankrupt
locally situate, and debts owing in England; secondly,
that an attaclinent of such property by an English creditor
after' such bankruptcy, with ot without notice to him, is in-
valid to over-reach the assignment; thirdly, that in England
the same doctrine holds, under assignments by her own bank-
ruptcy laws, as to personal property and debts of the bank-
rupt in forei,n_ countries; fourthly, that upon T)Lincipl, ..
a Sill v. Warwrick I H. B1. 690;b Sill v. Ur'ick I H.fl
691 note; Solomon v. Ross 1 H.Bl - 131; Ex;Far~A Blakes
I Cox C ses in 7,1. 393.
c Sill v. !Uarvick supra.
all attachments made by foreign creditors after such assign-
ment, in a foreign country ought to be held invalid; fifthlY,
that at all events, a British creditor will not be permitted
to hold the property acquired by a judgment under any attach-
ments made in a foreign country after such assigunent;
and sixtlhly, uhat a foreign creditor, not subjected to
British laws, will be penmitted to retain any such property,
acquired under any such judgment, if the local laws (however
incorrectly upon principle) confer on him an 
absolute title!a
It is argued in support of the English rule, that it
is the only one which can be effectual and -ive due recog-
nition to comizy. Any different system,'which prefers an
attaching domestic creditor to a foreign assignee, or to
foreign cr'editors, can scarcely fail to bring on a retaliatory
system of preferences in every other nation injured thereby.
The early cases in ,ew York followed the English rule,
Chancellor Kent deciding in three New York cases that "It is
a principle of practice among natdons to admit and give ef-
fect to the title of foreign assignees. This is done on
the ground that a conveyance under the bankruptcy laws of
the country where the ovmer is domicile is equivalent to a
a Story Conflict of Laws 572.
voluntary conveyance by the bankrupt. "a
In one of these1 the learned Chancellor, after an
exhaustive-review of all the English cases on the subject,
and comrqensin, on the fact that in the case at bar the
assignor in addition to the assignment brought about by the
bankruptcy act, had executed a voluntary assignment of all
personal property "not being, arising, or growing in England,
with the evident intention of precluding any question as to
the foreign effect of the assignments, says: "This would
seem to have removed evenly obstacle in the case. But I do
not place much reliance on the distinction, and it does not
appear to me to make any difference in the application of the
principle whether he made the transfer himself or the law
of his domicile for him. It is in either case, in the con-
templation of the law, his act."
a Bird v. Caritat 2 John. 342
Ramond v Johnson 11 John. 488
1 Holmes v. Ransem 4 John. Ch. 460.
THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE.
As was set forth in the lasi Chapter, the general
course of Ameiican au-ho-i~y in the eaAelj cases followed
the law as laid down by uhu English CouA-s; buxr when he
case of Holmes v. Rensema came before the N. Y. Court on a
second appeal, a different rule was adopted, and Justice
Plait in a very able argumentt, dissented fom he Fiews
of Chancellor Kent and laiL down a new rule in the following
words: "The assignees of the bankrupt are in the same and
no better situation than the bank.r'upt himself in vegard to
foreign debts. They take subjecu to every equity and
subjecF to the remedies provid"d byr the laws of -,he foreign
counLry where the debt is due, and when permitted to sue
in a forcign country, it is nou as assignees having an in-
terest, but as representatives of the banko -,. The law of
the domicile having sequesuered the bankrupt's estate so
as to divest him of the control over it and appointed them
to administe, it, they stand here on the footing of adminis-
trators merely with the right of saeingin common with other
creditors; but our law will not regard a chose in action
as exclusively appropriated to their use and the preference
a Holmes v. Rensem 20 John. 229.
can onl r be gained by pusuing the remedies which on.r laws
afford".
The decision of Justice Plabt was so well reasoned and
its argument, so sozid WhaU it has been followed in N. Y. and
many of the other States and has come to be recognized as
the American doctrine. The cases in this State have ever
since ,niformly sustained the rights of domestic attaching
creditors against a title under a p,'ior statutory assignment
in another" State or coun* y;, the several states of -he union
a
being F. atd for. This pu~pose as foieign to each othev-
The departure in this country from the English rule with
respect to the universal operation of assignlments under for-
eign bank.rupu laws upon all personal p -op-.rty, was mainly
attiibutable to considuralions eff:cting domes ic ceeditozls.
Our own a-taching credi;ovs were to be prefer-ed to any
foreign assignees; so our local laws were to be defended
and sisiained as against those of any foreign staie.
In defence of the American doctrine, it is admitted
that the general r.le is Thai personal prnpe-)e , including
debts , has no locality but follows as to its disposition
and transfer the law of the domicile of the ow.ner. But this
does not preclude any country from regula-ing as it pleases
a Willets v. Wait, 25 N.Y. 57 7 ;Johison v. H}unt, 23 Wend.87;
Kelly v. Crapo/ 45 N. Y. 87.
the disposition of personal poperty found within it, and
it may pwefer its own attaching creditoes to any foreign
assignee. Then there is a marked distinction between a
voluntary conveyance made by the assignor, and a conyeyance
by operation of law in cases of bankruptcy in invitum .The
law does not force the assignor to make a conveyance; it
does not coerce his will; it simply. exerts iWs right to
protec4 his creditors by stripping him of all The property
within its reach and applying it to the paimenu of his debts.
The law of any state, or country applies onl-, to persons
o±' property within its jurisdiction, and can have no effect
on what is without. By his own voluntary act he can di-
vest himself of all his property without .'ega-d to place;
the law can only take what it can.reachlhaving the strictest
a
regard to place.
The American doctrine as laid down in Holmes v. Rensem
has however been subject to much variation in the different
states. It is apparent that the reason for the rule does
not include foreign creditors domiciled in 'he state wherein
the assignment originated, or even any creditors who are not
domiciled in the state wherein the assignment is sought to be
a Holmes v. Rensem 20 Johns. 229, 258, 259.
enforced. There would appear to be good reason why comity
should recognize the title of a foreign assignee, as against
foreign abtadhing creditors. This is held to be the law
in several states and in the United States Cou.rts. The latte
courts have held that in a case where an assignment with
preferences had been made in N. Y. by a resident of that
State, a firm doing business in N. Y., one member of which was
a resident of New Jersey, obtained an attachment in New
Jersey agains; a debt due to the assignors. In an action
broughi, by the assignors, for -he benefit1 of the assignee
to collecT iuhis debt, it was held that the attacLment was
no defence, the assignent being good as against any but
New Jersey creditors, and tha fact that a membe" of the
New York firm was a resident of New Jersey did not bring
the firm within the exception.a  So the Illinois Courts
have held that an assignment with preferences executed in
New York between citizens of that State, would be deemed a
valid transfer of property in Illinois as against an attach-
ment sued out by a resident of Massachusetts.b
Some of the States while refusing to recognize the title
a Halstead v. Strauss 32 Fed. '79
b May v. First National Bank 11 West. 638.
of a foreign assignee, even in case of a voluntary assign-
ment where it comes into conflict with the claims of domes-
tiv creditors, a make a distinction where the domicile of the
foreign assignee and the creditor are the same, and hold that
in such case the latter will be bound by the title of the
b
former, good by the law of the coimon domicile. The prin-
ciple of comity in these states is held to apply so as to
subject non-residents to the operation of the foreign law,
but not so as to prevent domestic creditors from pursuing
a remedy in defiance of the foreign assignment.c
This would seem to be the most rational doctrine. The
state, by providing that the rights of its citizens in re-
lation to property within its jurisdiction, shall in no
case by jeopardized by the laws of a foreign states has fully
protected their interests. Especially ought the courts of
a state to deny access to attacking creditors from the state
where the assignment was made. In England, a British credi-
tor who thus seeks to defeat the operation of the law of
a Bentley v. Whittemore,19 IT T. Eq. 462.
b Moore v. Barnell, 2 Vroom 90;
Sanderson v. Bradfordl0 I. H. 260;
May v. Wannemacher,111 Mass. 202.
c Faulkner v. Hymen,146 Mass. 53.
equality is treated as a trustee, and in an action by the
assignee may be compelled to refund what he secured by at-
tachment in foreign parts, or he may be restrained by in-
junction from proce~eding against the estate of the insolvent
in a foreign jurisdiction. But the New York Courts, and
probably the weight of authority in this country, is against
even this limited application of the doctrine of comity.
To sus-!ain and fortify the position taken for the protec-
tion of domestic c-editors, The Courts have substantially
shut out foreign assignees altogether. Chiuf Justice
Marshall declared that the bankrupt law of a foreign country
is incapable of operating a legal transfer of property in the
a
United States * It has even been doubted whether the
assignee may sue here at all but the better opinion is
that he may: Not however as an assignee having an interest,
b
but as a representative of the bankrupt
The restrictions against foreign assignees have been
gradually tightened in New York# and in 1885 the case of
in re Wait came before the Court and Judge Earl, writing
the opinion, after an exhaustive review of all the authori-
ties, formulated three propositions which he concludes ex-
a Ogden v. Saunders, 12 VWheat. 174
b Hibernia Bank v. Mechanics' &c., Bank. 21 Hun 166,174.
press the doctrine of the Courts. The facts of the case
were these: Wait was a member of a firm whose principal
business was conducted in London, though he was a resident
of New York City and a citizen of the State. In 172l a
firm in New York made an assignment, naming Wait as assignee
and preferring the claim of the firm of which Wait was a
member. Early in 1882 Wait went to England and in con-
nection with his partner instituted a proceeding for the
liquidation of their debts, which resulted in the L ankrupt-
cy Court declaring Wait a bankrupt and appointing a trustee
in bankruptcy to take charge of his estate. Wait continued
as assignee of the New York firm and later returned to
New York and paid to himself, as a member of the English
firm, the amount of the preference. On the accounting,,the
Justice of the claim was contested by the English trustee
in bankruptcy of Wait's firm, who urged that the debt should
have been pa id to him.
The court sustained his claim though they seem even
in that case to put the decision on the ground of estopple.
They say: "It matters notthatWait is a citizen of this
country domiciled here. He went to England and invoked
and submitted to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Courts
there, and is bound by its adjudication to the same extent
as if he had been domiciled there. The adjudication estopp-
ed him just as every party is estopped by the adjudication
of a court which has jurisdiction of his perscn and of the
subject matter".
The propositions of law which Judge Earl concludes
are sound are as follows:
First, a Statute of a foreign state has no effect hare
of its own force. Foreign assignees in bankruptcy and in-
solvency have no standing here by virtue of the foreign
Statutes.
Second; But comity allows a certian affect to title
derivedil, under foreign insolvent laws, provided they can
be recognized without injustice to our own citizens, with-
out prejudice to creditors pursuing their remedies under
out- laws, and provided they are not in conflict with pub-
lic policy.
Third, subject to the above conditions foreign assignees
a
may sue in this state.
a In re Waite 99 N. Y. 433.
The foregoing rules apply even where the assignment is
made before the lien of the creditor is obtained in our
Court. It will be noticed that in the above case there
were no creditors whatever seeking a remedy against the
property in our Courts. It was the bankrupt himself at-
tempting to take advantage of our laws to defraud his cred-
itors, and this, the Court declared it would not be a
party to. This is the only case, however where the Court
will permit the foreign assignee to recover in our Courts.
In a late case decided in November 1893 it was held that
Wisconsin creditors of a bankrupt firm assigned under the
laws of that State could attach property of the firm in
this State and such attacynent would be good as against
the assignee though subsequent in point of time.a
Such is the law of New York, and such appears to be the
American doctrine. Scarcely any of our States follow the
English doctrine as laid down by the English Courts but
scarcely any two agree as to the extent to which the Amer-
ican doctrine shall be applied. Pushed to the extreme
limit the New Yoxl rule might work serious injustice to
debtors of the bankrupt as for instance in the case of
a Barth v. Backus 140 N. Y. 230
Douglas v. Insurance Co. where the Insurance Company be-
came liable to a bankrupt residing in Massachusetts for a
risk incur-ed in New York. Two actions were brought against
the Insurance Company; one in Massachusetts by the assignee
of the bankrupt; and one in New York by a creditor seeking
to attach the debt. The New York Courts held that the
Massachusetts action constituted no bar to the attachment ,
as according to our interpretation, no action of the Massa-
chusetts law could transfer from the bankrupt the title
to a chose in action situated in New York. It said: "The
legal proceedings or judgments of another state are recog-
nized here only where jurisdiction has been acquired ac-
cording to the course of the common law in the foreign forum;
and this although the Statutes of that state purport to
give its courts jurisdiction, in disregard of the principles
and rules of general jurisprudence, which this state is
bound to recognize." Thus it seems that under such cir-
cmstances the debt might be collected in both jurisdictions.
Just how the Courts will correct this manifest injustice,
whether by modifying the rule, by equitable intervention
a Douglas v. Insurance Co., 138 N. Y., 209.
or by some other means remains to be seen.
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